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This article investigates the real effects of the recent global financial crisis by using industry 
panel data across 82 countries. We find that industry growth indicators experienced a sharp 
drop following the crisis.  However, a closer inspection indicates that an adverse effect is 
pronounced in industries that are more dependent on external finance, and also in those 
industries that rely on trade credit due to under-developed financial intermediation.  It is also 
found that low- and lower-middle income countries tend to experience a lesser impact on 
growth. These findings provide new evidence of the negative externalities associated with 
credit-market friction. 
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1      Introduction 
Many studies have tested the so-called finance-industry growth nexus, and most of the 
empirical evidence reports a robust, positive, causal effect of finance on industry growth (e.g. 
King and Levine 1993, Rajan and Zingales 1998 and Levine et al. 2000).  In particular, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) find that industries and firms that rely heavily on external financing 
grow disproportionately faster in countries with well-developed banks than in countries with 
poorly developed financial systems.   These studies employ volume measures of finance and 
implicitly focus on the quantity effects of financial development on economic growth. A new 
strand of empirical studies has attempted to investigate the impact of quality-based variables 
such as bank market structure on industry growth (Claessens and Laeven 2005 and Maudos 
and Fernandez de Guevara 2006).   
 It is recognised that financial markets, in general, and banking systems, specifically, 
have greater incentives to finance non-financial firms during a period of financial stability.  
Besides, more financially dependent firms are willing to establish lending relationships with 
banks, enhancing their access to external finance, consequently increasing economic growth.   
Previous studies have, however, pointed out that private sector growth should slow down in 
response to credit crunches (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2004 and Love 
et al. 2007).  For example, in Love et al (2007), the financial crises of the 1990s in emerging 
markets presented extreme cases of the collapse of institutional financing.   Love et al. find 
that the provision of trade-credit contracts after the crisis that follows a bank credit-crunch.  
These studies suggest that the amount of credit available for firms dependent on external 
finance is likely to fall during a financial crisis. Moreover, firms have fewer incentives to 
enter into lending relationships with banks if they suspect that banks are unstable, or may be 
about to go bankrupt due to a banking crisis.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 In terms of the availability of credit during the current financial crisis, Figure 1 shows 
the trend of corporate and commercial loans and also the total loans as a fraction of total 
assets of the banking sectors of 79 economies for the period 1998-2011
2
. As can be seen, up 
to 2007, the ratio of loans to total assets is constant, however, during the crisis a sharp decline 
is observed. Specifically, during the period 2007-2008 corporate and commercial loans 
dramatically fall.  Kapan and Minoiu (2013) study the role of bank balance sheets with a 
particular emphasis on capital and structural liquidity in influencing the transmission of shocks to 
the economy through the conduit of bank lending.  Analysing the lending behaviour of more than 
800 financial institutions across 55 advanced and emerging countries during 2006–2010, Kapan 
and Minoiu find that bank balance-sheet strength matters in curtailing lending faced with adverse 
shocks:  Banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding with lower structural liquidity were 
more exposed to liquidity shocks during the crisis, so reducing lending more than other banks. On 
the other hand, better-capitalized banks that were exposed to the shocks decreased their supply of 
credit less than other banks.  The observation of a sharp fall of corporate and commercial loans in 
Figure 1 appears to illustrate overall bank vulnerability to liquidity shocks during the crisis, 
reducing their supply of credit.  Industrial sectors, especially, those that are more reliant on 
external finance, may have suffered from this shortage of credit supply.  Raw findings 
indicate a negative impact of the financial crisis on industry growth.  The recent global 
financial crisis, and the global deleveraging process that ensued, offers perhaps the most 
convincing evidence to investigate empirically the economic relevance of financial frictions 
and their real effects. 
In an attempt to analyse the link between financial shocks and the real economy, 
Kroszner et al. (2007) examine the impact of banking crises on the growth of industries with 
different levels of dependence on external finance over the previous crisis period of 1980 to 
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2000. Using data for 38 countries which experienced a banking crisis, they find that a 
financial crisis had a disproportionately negative impact on sectors that rely more on external 
sources of finance if they are located in countries with developed financial systems.  For 
instance, in a country experiencing a banking crisis, a sector at the 75th percentile of external 
dependence and located in a country at the 75th percentile of private credit to GDP would 
experience a 1.6% greater contraction in growth in value-added between the crisis and pre-
crisis period compared with a sector at the 25th percentile of external dependence and private 
credit to GDP.  Recently two studies have attempted to investigate the real effects of the 
recent financial crisis.  Klapper and Love (2011) study the effects of the 2008 global financial 
crisis on new firm registrations in 95 countries. They find that approximately all countries 
experienced a significant decline in business formation during the crisis.  Moreover, their 
study reveals that for countries with well-developed financial sectors the crisis had a greater 
negative impact on business creation. Laeven and Valencia (2013) also study the real effects 
of disruption in the supply of credit. Using data for the recapitalization of banking sectors as 
well as firm-level data for 50 countries during the crisis period 2008-2009, Laeven and 
Valencia  find that recapitalization policies enhanced the value-added growth of firms that are 
more dependent on external sources of finance. Overall, these studies highlight the 
importance of supply-side financial frictions in influencing real economic activities.       
The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the real impact of the current 
global financial crisis by using industry panel data for 23 manufacturing industries in 82 
countries
3
.  The main feature of our study is as follows: Being distinguished from Klapper 
and Love (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013), we investigate the direct crisis-effect on 
industry growth by using industry-level data realised by the UNIDO (United Nations 
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Database on Industrial Statistics). Specifically, we consider two alternative measures of 
industry growth: investment growth and output growth. The former is measured by the 
growth of fixed capital formation, and the latter is measured by the growth of industry output 
and value added. Our approach is rigorous as we estimate the model in alternative dimensions 
that embrace i) the heterogeneity effects of the financial crisis on the performance of 
industries with different levels of dependence on external finance, which is absent from the 
work of Klapper and Love (2011), ii) the monetary policy effects and financial development 
as control variables, iii) the different stages of economies measured by their level of income, 
and iv) the effects of the market- and bank-based economies.   
Kroszner et al. (2007) contribute to the literature on the mechanisms linking financial 
shocks and real economic activity.  Kroszner et al. focus on banking crises by investigating 
the impact of banks on the provision of credit and liquidity to firms during times of banking 
distress.  The attempt is made to assess other types of economic shocks such as currency 
crises and economic recessions, however, it is found that such shocks do not generate a 
growth effect on industry
4
.  Our approach is distinctive in that we focus on the recent global 
financial crisis.  It engulfed the collapse of large financial institutions in some developed 
economies together with a sharp drop of stock markets worldwide.  In general, this crisis 
played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth, and a 
downturn in economic activity leading to the European sovereign-debt crisis.  Given that the 
recent crisis has been unlike anything seen for decades, our study which utilises all 82 
countries based on data availability for the period of 2000-2010, is more robust and wider in 
scope in comparison with that of Kroszner et al. (2007), and the findings would be 
contributory to understanding the effect of the crisis on the real economy.       
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 There are, potentially, a number of linkages, which propagate shocks across borders, 
leading to the decline of industry growth.  For instance, Claessens et al. (2012) examine how 
the 2007–2009 crisis affected firms' performance, using accounting data for 7722 non-
financial firms in 42 countries.  Claessens et al.  analyse three channels through which the 
crisis may have affected firms: a business-cycle channel, a trade channel, and a financial 
channel.  They find that the crisis had a bigger, negative impact on firms with greater 
sensitivity to business cycles and trade developments in countries more open to trade, while 
the evidence for the role of financial linkages is considerably weaker.  In Yamamoto (2014), 
it is found that US spillover shocks, through both US financial and trade linkages, exert a 
significant impact on production in Asian economies, accounting for around 50% of the 
production fluctuation, with the impact of financial shocks being greater than that of trade 
shocks.  The study of Feldkircher (2014) relates the role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping 
the real economy’s response to the crisis.  Feldkircher argues that buoyant growth in real 
GDP, accompanied by strong growth of credit, particularly exacerbated the effects of the 
recent crisis on the real economy.   Our identification strategy exploits the crisis itself as a 
shock to credit supply, as shown in Figure 1, and measures the impact on industry growth by 
combining an exogenous measure of firms’ dependence on external financing5.      
 Empirical results reveal that, in general, industry growth indicators experienced a 
sharp drop following the crisis. However, such impact is statistically heterogeneous among 
industries, since the crisis has had a negative impact mainly on those industries which are 
more reliant on external finance. The recent financial crisis also appears to alter the growth of 
those industries that rely heavily on trade credit, depending on whether they are located in 
financially developed countries or in financially under-developed countries.  Furthermore, 
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while both bank-based and market-based economies have been negatively affected by the 
crisis, low and lower-middle income countries tend to experience less contraction of growth.       
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the illustration of the 
model and data. The main empirical results are reported in Section 3.  Section 4 applies the 
model proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) by interacting the degree of external financial- 
dependence of industries with financial development, and Section 5 concludes. 
2      Model specification and data 
2.1  Model specification 
In order to test the impact of the crisis on industry, we investigate formally the relationship 
between the financial crisis and industry growth. Following Klapper and Love (2011), the 
base model for estimation takes the form of  
                                                      (1) 
The dependent variable is industry growth in each industry i and each country c with time 
period t.  Industry growth is    the growth rate of fixed capital formation,     output growth, 
and iii) value-added growth in a particular industry in each country.  In order to isolate the 
impact of the crisis event from long term trends, we include a linear       variable into the 
model. The US subprime crisis triggered the global crisis in 2007, and Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy in September 2008 witnessed the peak of the crisis.  The effect began with the 
data for 2007 for some countries, however, the paramount effect was felt in 2008 in many 
countries.  We specify crisis dummy (Cris) to identify the year 2008 with one for crisis 
period 2008-2010 and 0 otherwise
6
.         is a vector of control variables. The model also 
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 In the preliminary analyses, the dummy 2008 is well-determined, whereas the dummy 2007 performs poorly.   
Hence, we focus on the dummy 2008.    
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specifies industry (  ) and country (  ) fixed effects (though not reported in tables to save 
space).  Errors (Ɛ) is clustered at the industry-level. 
 We consider two control variables: a real interest rate to capture the impact of 
monetary policy and an indicator of financial development (i.e. the ratio of domestic credit to 
the private sector to GDP).  The monetary policy variable determines the availability of credit 
in economies, and a higher level of interest rate is expected to exert a negative impact on 
growth, whereas financial development would boost industry growth.  It may be argued that 
government intervention is an endogenous response to real economic activity. However, our 
empirical strategy is valid as long as government policies are not correlated with financial 
dependence at an industry level.   
2.2    Data  
The information needed to measure industry growth is taken from the Industrial Statistics 
Database which is collected by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) for 23 sectors at 2-digits (classified in ISIC Rev.3.1). The dependent variables 
(industry growth) will be the annual growth rate of    fixed capital formation,      output and 
     value added. The dataset for estimation is constituted with 23 industries in each country 
for each year during the sample period 2000-2010
7
.  If a country reports the data for at least 
one of our dependent variables for the crisis period under consideration, then we include that 
country in our dataset. Note that not all countries report the data for all variables during the 
crisis period 2008-2010, hence, the number of observations varies according to the dependent 
variable.  Furthermore, following previous researchers, we eliminate the U.S. as this country 
is the source of the financial crisis and also the data for this country is used to measure the 
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 The year 2010 is the last year of availability of industry data in the UNIDO database as the data is released 
with a multi-year lag. 
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degree of external financial-dependence. The final dataset includes an unbalanced panel with 
three dimensions of industry, country and year of observations from 82 countries.  
 The data on country-level variables such as financial development and real interest 
rates are obtained from the World Bank – World Development Indicators (WDI). See 
Appendix for the sample selection in Panel A and the definition and source of the variables 
used in this paper in Panel B.        
[Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 2 plots the mean values of industry growth indicators for all 82 selected 
countries. Three industry growth indicators exhibit a similar movement over the sample 
period with a moderate fluctuation of growth until 2007.  With the onset of the financial 
crisis, a sharp fall in growth is observed, indicating the contraction of economic growth 
during the crisis.  Figure 3 shows the evolution of the three measures of industry growth by 
selecting the two countries of the UK (regarded as a market-based economy in terms of 
finance sources) and Germany (deemed to be a bank-based economy).   In both cases, the 
effect of crisis shock emerges after the year 2007.  The bank-based economy, Germany, has 
shown a relatively radical movement compared with the UK.  Overall, these illustrations in 
Figures 2 and 3 clearly suggest that industry growth has been negatively affected by the 
recent global financial crisis, and they provide a powerful motivation to statistically 
investigate the impact in a panel of countries.   
3      Empirical results 
3.1  Base model 
[Table 1 about here] 
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The empirical results based on Eq. (1) are presented in Table 1 for investment growth, output 
growth and value added growth, respectively.  The data appear to fit the model very well, 
since all coefficients are statistically significant.  The trend is positive, indicating that 
industry was performing better over time.   The models (1), (3) and (5) specify crisis 
dummies without control variables.  The crisis dummy is highly significant at a 1% level with 
a negative sign in all cases, showing a clear picture of the adverse effects on industry growth.  
Note that the magnitude of the coefficients are close to each other at around -0.2, implying 
that the shock is equally felt across different growth indicators.  The models (2), (4) and (6) 
are estimated with control variables.  Both control variables are also well-determined with the 
highly significant coefficients at a 1% level in all cases.  The coefficient of real interest rates 
is negative, being consistent with theory. This signifies the effect of the transmission channel 
of monetary policy on industry growth, though the effect may be less powerful at a time of 
crisis when banks are capital-constrained.  A positive impact of financial development 
implies that countries with more developed financial systems are more capable of 
recapitalizing banks and deeper financial systems could offer alternative sources of financing 
at a time of financial crisis.  The effect of the crisis remains robust with these control 
variables specified in the baseline model.  The detrimental effects of the financial crisis have 
penetrated deeply into the real economy when Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008.   
3.2     Heterogeneous effects of the crisis 
3.2.1 High external finance dependence effects  
One plausible channel which financial development may affect industrial sectors is through 
financing industries that rely more on external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). If this is 
the case, those industries that are more dependent on external finance should be affected 
more severely by the credit crunch that characterizes the financial crisis.  They were more 
11 
 
likely to experience larger contractions in investment, output and value-added growth, since 
diminishing finance should have a large negative impact on industries where external finance 
is more important.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 To examine this issue, we first compute each industry’s external financial-dependence 
taken from Klapper et al. (2006) at a two digit level by the classification of ISIC Rev.2 based 
on Rajan and Zingales' (1998) approach
8
. The threshold for differentiating amongst various 
industries with different levels of dependence on external financing is set at 0.30, which is the 
mean of all 23 industries’ degree of financial dependence. An industry is classified as more 
dependent if it exceeds the threshold, and less dependent if it has a degree of financial 
dependency below the threshold
9
.     
In Figure 4, we plot industry growth indicators over time for two types of industries: 
one with more dependence on external finance versus the other with less dependence.  As can 
be seen, until 2007 both types of industries had more or less a similar pattern of growth.  
However, after the 2007 financial crisis, the growth of those industries that rely on external 
finance has shown a more dramatic decline.  In particular, in the case of growth of fixed 
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 Klapper et al. used U.S. firm-level data to estimate the external financial-dependence of different 
manufacturing sectors over the period 1990-1999, which is employed as a benchmark for other countries. This is 
an industry-level median of the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures. Cash 
flow is defined as the sum of funds from operations, decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and 
increases in payables. Capital expenditures include net acquisitions of fixed assets. See Rajan and Zingales, 
(1998) and. Klapper et al. (2006).   
9
 For example, industries such as Recycling, and Rubber Products, and Radio, television and communications 
with 0.47, 0.69 and 1.04, respectively are classified as industries with greater dependence on external finance, 
while industries such as Wood Products, Furniture, and Tobacco with 0.28, 0.24 and -0.45, respectively, are 





capital formation, a wider gap is observed. This supports our argument that industries with 
greater dependence on external finance were more affected by the crisis.    
[Table 2 about here] 
To test statistically whether the financial crisis has had a heterogeneous impact on industry 
performance, we re-estimate Eq. (1) by splitting the sample into high and low externally-
dependent industries.  We classify an industry as a high externally-dependent industry if it 
has a score of financial dependence greater than the median of all industries, and as a low 
externally-dependent one, if it is otherwise.  We run regression for each panel separately.  
The result is shown in Table 2 with Panel A for high and Panel B for low externally 
dependent industries, respectively.  We find a statistically significant impact of the crisis 
dummy on industry growth indicators in Panel A. However, in Panel B, there is no statistical 
evidence for the output and value-added growth models, whereas we see it only at the 10% 
significance level for the fixed-capital growth model.  It seems that the crisis had less or no 
adverse influence on those industries with low external-dependence.   The result accords with 
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2006), who argue that if banking crises exogenously hinder real activity, 
then sectors more dependent on external finance should perform relatively worse during 
banking crises.  Our findings indeed suggest that the financial crisis has had a heterogeneous 
impact on industry performance, confirming our prior observations in Figure 4.   
 
3.2.2     Countries with different levels of income, regions and bank-based versus 
market-based countries  
Next, we investigate whether the crisis has had an effect on industry growth which is 





), different regions and the source of finance (bank-based and market based 
countries
11
).     
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows the differences in growth in investment, output and value added 
between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period for individual countries (together with the 
different income groups, the different regions and market- and bank-based countries at the 
end of the table).  It seems that the decline given by the negative difference in industry 
growth during the crisis period is not only prevailing in developed countries, but also in 
emerging and developing countries. For example, emerging economies such as Kuwait, 
Latvia, Malta and Poland show a more than 40% decline in investment growth.  The average 
decline indicates that high and upper-middle income countries and regionally, Europe and 
Central Asian area, suffer more from the crisis. Furthermore, industry growth in bank-based 
countries appears to decline more than that of market-based countries.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 We empirically test the heterogeneous effects of the income level and the base of 
external finance.  The results are presented in Table 4.  In Panel A, we exclude the high and 
upper-middle income countries and in Panel B, bank-based countries are excluded from the 
model.  For a comparative study, Panel C presents the initial values of the crisis coefficients 
reproduced from the baseline model in Table 1.  When we investigate only low and lower-
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 We divide our countries into low-, middle- and high-income countries according to World Bank definitions. 
We have 8 countries classified as low-income, 38 countries as middle-income and 36 countries as high-income 
countries.   
11
 Our sample countries are divided into two groups: bank-based countries if the ratio of credit provided by the 
banking sector to market capitalization is greater than the cross-country average and market-based countries if 
the ratio is smaller than the cross-country average.  Data are taken from World Bank WDI database.  Note that 
since the classification is purely based on the statistics, it should not be interpreted as the real engine of these 
economies.  The intention is to examine the general tendency across countries.   
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middle income countries in Panel A, the crisis coefficients become statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level, implying that there is no discernible impact from the crisis present in these 
income-group countries. A similar result is also found in Kroszner et al (2007) that greater 
contraction of value-added during a banking crisis is only found in countries with deeper 
financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. The result also supports 
the finding by Klapper and Love (2011) that the decline in new firm registrations is more 
pronounced in countries with well-developed financial markets.  This is either because 
immature financial markets do not have an adequate mechanism for shocks to be transmitted 
into the market in the short run, or because some developing markets may have undertaken 
financial reforms, for example, by increasing foreign reserves, reducing government debt and 
restricting, or strictly controlling, foreign borrowings (Dooley and Hutchison 2009 and Wang 
and Moore 2012).   
In Panel B, even though bank-based countries are excluded, the crisis coefficients 
remain statistically highly significant at the 1% level, albeit the magnitude of the coefficients 
falls slightly as compared with the initial values in Panel C.  This is not surprising since the 
shockwave was not restricted to the banking sector, but prevalent throughout the whole of the 
financial markets.      
  
4 Ragan and Zingales (1998) method 
As a sensitivity test, we apply an industry growth model of Ragan and Zingales (1998) to 
examine whether the real effects of the financial crisis remains robust.  In order to avoid 
some problems of identification that arise in the cross-country regressions which are observed 
in the literature on economic growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) developed an innovative 
specification by introducing the interaction between an industry characteristic (external 
15 
 
financial dependence) and a country characteristic (financial development) for the cross-
section study.
12
  Specifically, we estimate the model as given by 
                                                      (2) 
Industry growth is defined as in Eq. (1) but here    indicates industry and    is for country 13. 
Since sectors with large initial shares in the industry usually grow at a slower rate, we 
introduce the beginning-of-period sector share in value-added (S    ) in order to capture the 
possible “convergence” effect at a sectoral level 14 .   Financial development variables 
(Fin.Dev.) are considered to be strong indicators of growth.  We specify the ratio of domestic 
credit to private sector with GDP.  The data are retrieved from the WDI over the period of 
2000-2010.  Ext.Fin. is the measure of external-financing dependence of an industry as 
explained in Section 3.  Any unobserved industry- or country-specific heterogeneity is  
captured by industry (  ) and country (   )  fixed effects.    is the error term with normal 
distribution.   
 Separately, we specify the interaction of financial development with trade credit 
instead of external finance.  Fisman and Love (2003) argue that in poorly-developed financial 
markets, implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit may provide an alternative source of 
funds.  Fisman and Love find that industries with higher dependence on trade credit exhibit 
higher rates of growth in countries with weaker financial institutions. Applying this concept, 
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 This approach has been adopted and expanded by a number of studies including that of Kroszner et al. (2007).   
13
 Note that in Section 3 we estimated the model based on panel datasets with three dimensions of industry, 
country and year. In this cross-section model, we estimate with the two dimensions of industry and country. 
Thus, the observations are the averages over time for each industry and country (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
14
                        is the share of industry   in total manufacturing in country   in 2000.  It is the 
beginning-of-period sector share in value-added as given by: 
                       
                                      
                                     
 
   
 
The data are taken from UNIDO and the authors' own computation. 
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we examine the extent to which industries that are more reliant on trade credit are affected by 
the crisis.  The data of industry-level measures of trade credit are taken from Fisman and 
Love (2003). To obtain a value for each industry, Fisman and Love take the median of the 
ratio of accounts payable to total assets for U.S. firms for the period 1980-1989.  A negative 
sign is expected on the coefficient of the interaction, if our result is in line with that of 
Fisman and Love (2003).     
[Table 5 about here] 
See Table 5, where the cross-section regressions are estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with the country and industry dummies.  The result of the interaction of 
financial development with external finance is found in Panel A and that with trade credit is 
in Panel B.  The coefficient on Financial development x Ext.Fin. is positive and significant 
during the pre-crisis period.  During the ‘‘normal’’ period, financially-dependent sectors 
grow disproportionately faster in countries with well-developed or deeper financial systems, 
which is consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kroszner et al. (2007). 
During the crisis period, however, it appears that such a relationship is not sustainable, since 
the coefficients on the interaction term are all insignificant.  Moreover, 'Share in value-added' 
becomes insignificant in the fixed-capital formation and output models, and the convergence 
effect across industries is likely to disappear during the crisis period.   
In Panel B, we find a negative sign with a statistical significance on the coefficient of 
the interaction of financial development with trade credit in the pre-crisis period of models  
(3) and (5).  This indicates that industries that rely heavily on trade credit grow faster in 
countries with underdeveloped financial intermediation.  Industry growth seems to be 
sustained by trade credit as a method of financing due to weak financial systems.  Our result 
supports the finding of Fisman and Love (2003).  However, during crisis periods, such a 
relationship seems to subside, as we find that the coefficients are  positive, though they are 
17 
 
statistically significant only at the 10% level.  This appears to indicate some crisis-specific 
feature.  While in normal periods trade credit is a source of finance for financially-dependent 
industries in less financially-developed countries, however, during the crisis period it 
becomes a source of finance for financially-developed countries.  Since the developed 
countries usually suffer more during a crisis, trade credit can be an alternative source of 
finance during a credit crunch. 
 These empirical results serve to provide the heterogeneous effects of the financial 
crisis in that externally financially-dependent industries may have suffered significantly from 
a contraction of growth, whereas those industries which are less dependent on external 
finance may have maintained their growth even during the crisis.  This confirms the results 
found in Table 2, where the crisis significantly contributed to the contraction of growth for 
the high external-finance dependent industries.  It is also noteworthy that the effect of trade 
credit on industry growth wanes with the crisis.    
 
5      Conclusion 
While most policy makers and economists agree that the recent global financial crisis has had 
adverse consequences for the economy as a whole, relatively little empirical work has been 
done to investigate the mechanisms by which financial crises generate problems in the real 
sector. In this paper, we analyse data on 23 industries in 82 countries to study the impact of 
the current financial crisis on industry performance during the period 2000-2010. The data 
appear to show that nearly all industry performance indicators experienced a sharp drop 
following the crisis. Closer inspection, however, reveals that such an impact is heterogeneous 
across industries.  The crisis has had a negative impact mainly on those industries more 
reliant on external finance. It is also found that low and lower-middle income countries tend 
to be less affected by the crisis.  There is, however, no discernible difference in the effect 
18 
 
between market-based and bank-based countries.  A shift in the effect of trade credit is also in 
evidence.  Our empirical findings are contributory to understanding the mechanisms through 





Sample selection, variables definitions and summary statistics 
Panel A: Sample selection of the main dataset 
All Drop Remaining
All countries included in UNIDO database (over 1963-2010) 166 166
Less
Years 1963-1999 166 166
Countries with no data on main dependent variables during crisis (2008-2010) 83 83
U.S. 1 82
Final sample (for 23 industries over 2000-2010) 82
Panel B: Variables definition and summary statistics of main variables
Variable Definition Mean Sta. Dev.
Industry growth variables
Fixed capital formation 0.061 0.531
Output 0.112 0.293




Share (in value added) 0.050 0.075
External finance              
dependence
0.301 0.296
Trade credit 0.088 0.015
Real interest rate 6.007 9.788
Financial development 66.263 54.421The ratio of domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP of a 
country over the period 2000-2010, which refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector. Source: World Bank-WDI and own 
calculation.
Annual growth rate of fixed capital formation in a particular sector for 23 
sectors in each country over 2000-2010. Source: UNIDO database, and own 
calculation.
External financial dependence of U.S. firms by ISIC sector over the period 
1990 to 1999. This is an industry-level median of the ratio of capital 
expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures. Cash flow is 
defined as the sum of funds from operations, decreases in inventories, 
decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. Capital expenditures 
include net acquisitions of fixed assets. Source: Klapper et al. (2006) based 
on the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. Source: World Bank-WDI.
Trend is a linear trend variable equal to 1 in 2000, equal to 2 in 2001, etc. 
It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the crisis period 2008-2010, and 
0 otherwise.
It is industry's dependence on trade credit calculated as the median of the 
ratio of accounts payable to total assets for U.S. firms for the period 1980-
1989. Source: Fisman and Love (2003).
Average annual growth rate of value added in a particular sector in each 
country over 2000-2010. Source: UNIDO database, and own calculation.
Annual growth rate of output in a particular sector for 23 sectors in each 
country over 2000-2010. Source: UNIDO database, and own calculation.
The value added of each sector for years 2000-2010 divided by the total 
value added of all sectors in a country for that year. Source: UNIDO 
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Table 1: The impact of the financial crisis on industry growth 
Regression results of model                                                   . Dependent variable is 
industry growth in each sector   in each country   over 2000-2010.       is a linear trend variable equal to 1 in 2000, equal 
to 2 in 2001, etc.      is equal to 1 for crisis period 2008-2010 and 0 otherwise.        is a vector of control variables. All 
models include industry (  ) and country (  ) fixed effects (not reported) and standard errors clustered at the industry-level. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. The robust t-values are presented in double 
parentheses based on the White heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors. Growth observations are winsorized at +100% 
and –100%. For detailed definitions of variables see Appendix. Sample size varies across regression specifications because 
not all variables are available for all industries, countries or for the full sample period.  
Industry growth over 2001-2010
Fixed capita l  formation Output Value added
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.028***
[7.04] [6.71] [14.60] [13.78] [14.06] [13.41]
Cris is -0.215*** -0.185*** -0.201*** -0.170*** -0.200*** -0.181***
[-11.03] [-7.84] [-23.94] [-17.76] [-20.05] [-15.63]
Real  interest rate -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
[-2.84] [-12.39] [-7.71]
Financia l  development 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[4.46] [10.90] [8.07]
Constant 0.191*** 0.236*** 0.218*** 0.064 0.113*** 0.167***
[3.37] [3.81] [5.70] [1.43] [3.43] [4.83]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 9186 7369 13753 11269 12676 10260






Table 2: The impact of the financial crisis on industry growth: High vs. low externally dependent industries 
Regression results of model                                                   . Dependent variable is 
industry growth in each sector   in each country   over 2000-2010.       is a linear trend variable equal to 1 in 2000, equal 
to 2 in 2001, etc.      is equal to 1 for crisis period 2008-2010 and 0 otherwise.        is a vector of control variables. All 
models include industry and country fixed effects (not reported) and standard errors clustered at the industry-level. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. The robust t-values are presented in double parentheses based 
on the White heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors. We classify an industry to high externally dependent one if it has a 
score of financial dependence greater than the median of all industries, and to a low externally dependent one if otherwise. 
Financial dependence score for each industry is taken from Klapper et al. (2006) at two-digit based on Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) approach. Growth observations are winsorized at +100% and –100%. For detailed definitions of variables see 
Appendix. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all countries or for 
the full sample period. 
Industry growth over 2001-2010
Fixed capi ta l  formation Output Value added
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: High externally dependent industries
Trend 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.027***
[4.32] [5.16] [9.46] [8.82] [9.47] [9.10]
Cris i s -0.179*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.145*** -0.163*** -0.151***
[-6.45] [-4.96] [-13.87] [-10.52] [-11.58] [-9.21]
Real  interest rate -0.003* -0.005*** -0.004***
[-1.71] [-8.61] [-4.87]
Financia l  development 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003***
[4.06] [8.61] [5.44]
Constant 0.162** 0.193** 0.186*** 0.086 0.072* 0.125***
[2.17] [2.35] [3.66] [1.43] [1.67] [2.74]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 4595 3670 6827 5575 6289 5068
R-square 0.171 0.172 0.105 0.137 0.184 0.108
Panel B: Low externally dependent industries
Trend 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029***
[5.66] [4.34] [11.23] [10.64] [10.42] [9.80]
Cris is -0.151* -0.101 -0.073 -0.092 -0.102 -0.108
[-1.71] [-1.08] [-0.85] [-1.18] [-1.52] [-1.60]
Real  interest rate -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004***
[-2.25] [-8.84] [-5.93]
Financia l  development -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
[-1.25] [-1.30] [-1.60]
Constant 0.107 0.149* 0.205*** -0.019 0.123*** 0.175***
[1.34] [1.73] [3.62] [-0.29] [2.62] [3.60]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 4591 3699 6926 5694 6387 5192





Table 3:   The impact of the financial crisis on industry growth in 82 countries   
This table shows the differences in growth in fixed capital formation,  output and value added) between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period (source: UNIDO). Growth observations are the 
averages of 23 industries and are winsorized at +100% and –100%.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively.  The classification of income level and regions are 
based on the World Bank.  
Industry growth in 82 countries during pre-crisis (2001-2007) and crisis (2008-2010) periods
Fixed capital formation Output Value added
Pre-crisis Crisis Diff. Pre-crisis Crisis Diff. Pre-crisis Crisis Diff.
Row Country (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) (4) (5) (6)=(5)-(4) (7) (8) (9)=(8)-(7)
1 Afghanistan 0.436 0.103 -0.332***
2 Albania 0.260 0.060 -0.199 0.237 0.041 -0.196*** 0.195 0.177 -0.018
3 Armenia 0.197 -0.047 -0.244***
4 Australia 0.199 0.133 0.035 -0.098*** 0.092 0.025 -0.067
5 Austria 0.121 -0.084 -0.205*** 0.125 -0.029 -0.154*** 0.123 -0.064 -0.187***
6 Azerbaijan -0.159 -0.151 0.008 0.311 0.132 -0.178** 0.325 0.148 -0.177**
7 Belgium 0.088 0.125 0.037 0.097 -0.108 -0.205*** 0.067 -0.069 -0.135***
8 Bermuda -0.392 -0.389 0.003 0.011 -0.031 -0.041
9 Botswana 0.104 0.081 -0.023 0.110 0.106 -0.004
10 Brazil 0.142 0.140 -0.001 0.130 0.156 0.025
11 Bulgaria 0.137 0.236 -0.045 -0.281*** 0.257 -0.026 -0.283***
12 Canada 0.025 0.024 -0.001 0.019 0.000 -0.019
13 Chile 0.079 0.035 -0.044 0.071 0.086 0.015 0.057 0.064 0.006
14 China 0.268 0.244 -0.024 0.280
15 Colombia -0.294 0.144 0.062 -0.083*** 0.144 0.054 -0.089***
16 Congo 0.304 0.063 -0.241* 0.311 -0.093 -0.404***
17 Costa Rica 0.088 0.061 -0.028 0.079 0.065 -0.014**
18 Croatia 0.228 -0.050 -0.277***
19 Cyprus 0.058 -0.023 -0.081 0.122 -0.019 -0.141*** 0.120 -0.038 -0.158***
20 Denmark 0.072 -0.137 -0.209*** 0.091 -0.123 -0.214** 0.085 -0.117 -0.202***
21 Ecuador -0.089 0.001 0.090 0.160 0.170 0.010 0.153 0.325 0.172*
22 Eritrea -0.270 -0.336 -0.066 0.048 0.111 0.063 0.032 0.067 0.035
23 Estonia 0.120 0.201 0.002 -0.199*** 0.202 -0.022 -0.224***
24 Ethiopia 0.163 0.058 -0.105 0.139 0.096 -0.043 0.118 0.124 0.006
25 Fiji 0.006 -0.131 -0.137 0.074 -0.066 -0.140*** 0.067 -0.025 -0.092
26 Finland 0.120 -0.052 -0.171** 0.112 -0.105 -0.217*** 0.108 -0.117 -0.225***
27 France 0.074 0.063 -0.098 -0.161*** 0.060 -0.055 -0.115***
28 Georgia 0.002 0.127 0.124* 0.287 0.186 -0.101 0.254 0.244 -0.011
29 Germany 0.080 -0.025 -0.105** 0.097 -0.076 -0.172*** 0.081 -0.084 -0.165***
30 Hong Kong -0.070 -0.281 -0.211 -0.066 0.033 0.099** -0.090 -0.009 0.081*
31 Hungary 0.162 -0.078 -0.240*** 0.166 -0.087 -0.253*** 0.168 -0.045 -0.213***
32 India 0.274 0.104 -0.170** 0.199 0.104 -0.096** 0.203 0.071 -0.132***
33 Indonesia -0.096 0.112 0.062 -0.050 0.111 0.074 -0.037
34 Iran 0.014 0.012 -0.003 0.070 0.182 0.112* 0.057 0.142 0.085
35 Ireland 0.039 -0.192 -0.231*** 0.086 -0.119 -0.205*** 0.076 -0.167 -0.243***
36 Israel -0.013 -0.021 -0.008 0.065 0.011 -0.054* 0.063 0.042 -0.021**
37 Italy 0.070 -0.032 -0.102** 0.094 -0.075 -0.168*** 0.085 -0.105 -0.190***
38 Japan 0.063 0.014 -0.049 -0.004 0.059 0.063*** -0.012 0.068 0.080***
39 Jordan 0.128 0.118 -0.010 0.153 0.093 -0.060** 0.137 0.119 -0.018
40 Kenya 0.115 0.025 -0.090*** 0.117 0.029 -0.088**
41 Korea 0.140 0.236 0.096 0.088 -0.021 -0.109*** 0.076 -0.055 -0.131***
42 Kuwait 0.106 -0.342 -0.448*** 0.160 0.079 -0.081 0.108 -0.029 -0.137***
43 Kyrgyz Rep. 0.128 0.073 -0.056 0.157 0.136 -0.021
44 Latvia 0.255 -0.154 -0.409*** 0.250 -0.054 -0.305*** 0.247 -0.100 -0.347***
45 Lithuania 0.243 -0.098 -0.340*** 0.238 0.070 -0.168*** 0.256 0.013 -0.243***
46 Luxembourg 0.049 -0.181 -0.231 0.099 -0.142 -0.240*** 0.093 -0.135 -0.228***
47 Macao -0.203 -0.370 -0.167 0.054 -0.177 -0.231** 0.069 -0.193 -0.262**
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48 Macedonia 0.171 -0.009 -0.180 0.103 0.022 -0.082* 0.169 -0.018 -0.186***
49 Malawi 0.023 0.006 -0.018 0.135 0.223 0.088 0.046 0.381 0.336***
50 Malaysia 0.075 0.061 -0.014 0.108 0.086 -0.022 0.086 0.132 0.046
51 Malta 0.055 -0.459 -0.514*** 0.079 0.035 -0.043 0.049 0.025 -0.025
52 Mauritius 0.117 -0.017 -0.134** 0.115 -0.001 -0.116**
53 Mexico -0.055 0.153 0.208** 0.049 0.127 0.077* 0.028 0.159 0.131***
54 Moldova 0.200 0.031 -0.170 0.238 0.060 -0.178*** 0.305 0.111 -0.194***
55 Mongolia 0.224 0.045 -0.180 0.121 0.251 0.131
56 Morocco 0.076 0.349 0.273** 0.129 0.049 -0.079** 0.106 0.113 0.008
57 Netherlands 0.112 0.044 -0.068 0.085 0.024 -0.061 0.068 -0.024 -0.092**
58 New Zealand 0.118 -0.165 -0.282** 0.114 -0.150 -0.265*** 0.107 -0.123 -0.230***
59 Norway 0.169 -0.009 -0.178* 0.132 0.065 -0.067* 0.111 0.045 -0.067
60 Oman 0.039 0.182 0.144* 0.157 0.148 -0.009 0.121 0.218 0.097
61 Peru 0.100 0.128 0.028 0.097 0.129 0.031
62 Poland 0.168 -0.255 -0.424*** 0.175 -0.035 -0.210*** 0.188 -0.018 -0.207***
63 Portugal 0.049 0.072 0.023 0.088 -0.144 -0.232*** 0.090 -0.154 -0.244***
64 Qatar 0.256 0.107 -0.149* 0.190 0.120 -0.071
65 Romania 0.369 0.238 0.000 -0.238*** 0.185 0.033 -0.152***
66 Russia 0.308 0.053 -0.255*** 0.319 0.071 -0.248***
67 Senegal 0.108 0.054 -0.054 0.111 0.049 -0.062
68 Serbia 0.306 0.006 -0.300*** 0.258 -0.015 -0.273***
69 Singapore 0.010 0.077 0.067 0.084 0.051 -0.033 0.055 0.025 -0.031**
70 Slovak Rep. 0.313 -0.021 -0.334*** 0.262 0.069 -0.193*** 0.255 0.010 -0.244***
71 Slovenia 0.130 -0.083 -0.213*** 0.095 -0.054 -0.149*** 0.124 -0.059 -0.183***
72 South Africa 0.115 0.042 -0.074*** 0.119 -0.011 -0.130***
73 Spain 0.119 -0.078 -0.197*** 0.114 -0.096 -0.209*** 0.111 -0.098 -0.208***
74 Sri Lanka -0.604 -0.251 0.353*** -0.288 -0.024 0.264*** -0.178 0.024 0.202*
75 Sweden 0.056 -0.323 -0.379*** 0.098 -0.093 -0.192*** 0.089 -0.122 -0.211***
76 Tajikistan 0.129 0.393 0.264
77 Tanzania -0.043 0.014 0.370 0.356*** -0.017
78 Turkey 0.312 -0.083 -0.395*** 0.231 -0.009 -0.240*** 0.124 0.037 -0.088
79 Ukraine 0.264 -0.001 -0.265***
80 United Kingdom 0.032 -0.176 -0.209*** 0.043 -0.150 -0.192*** 0.053 -0.198 -0.252***
81 Uruguay 0.138 0.185 0.047 0.045 0.158 0.113 -0.002 0.147 0.150*
82 Vietnam 0.233 0.180 -0.052 0.270 0.370 0.100* 0.354 0.221 -0.134**
All countries 0.065 -0.052 -0.115*** 0.136 0.036 -0.100*** 0.123 0.029 -0.092***
   High income 0.075 -0.079 -0.154*** 0.106 -0.002 -0.108*** 0.090 -0.011 -0.101***
   Upper-middle income 0.093 -0.005 -0.098*** 0.168 0.068 -0.099*** 0.157 0.061 -0.096***
   Lower-middle income 0.089 0.047 -0.043 0.191 0.051 -0.140*** 0.165 0.110 -0.055**
   Low income -0.025 -0.096 -0.071 0.118 0.118 -0.000 0.079 0.131 0.052
   Bank based countries 0.070 -0.051 -0.121*** 0.136 0.023 -0.113*** 0.121 0.021 -0.100***
   Market-based countries 0.110 -0.004 -0.114*** 0.144 0.051 -0.093*** 0.125 0.057 -0.068***
   East Asia and Pacific 0.069 0.078 0.009 0.177 0.130 -0.047** 0.145 0.132 -0.013
   Europe and Central Asia 0.172 -0.041 -0.213*** 0.234 0.033 -0.201*** 0.237 0.054 -0.182***
   High-income non-OECD 0.042 -0.100 -0.141*** 0.108 0.046 -0.062*** 0.081 0.036 -0.046*
   High-income OECD 0.108 -0.058 -0.167*** 0.105 -0.050 -0.155*** 0.098 -0.058 -0.156***
   Latin America & Car. -0.063 0.122 0.185** 0.106 0.110 0.004 0.092 0.126 0.035*
   Middle East and North Af. 0.076 0.122 0.046 0.112 0.098 -0.013 0.102 0.123 0.021
   South Asia 0.109 -0.105 -0.214*** 0.155 0.041 -0.114*** 0.129 0.042 -0.087*
   Sub-Saharan Africa -0.025 -0.096 -0.071 0.113 0.076 -0.037* 0.101 0.062 -0.039*  
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Table 4:  The impact of the financial crisis on industry growth in low- and lower-middle income and market-based countries 
Regression results of model                                                  . Dependent variable is 
industry growth in each sector   in each country   over 2000-2010.       is a linear trend variable equal to 1 in 2000, equal 
to 2 in 2001, etc.      is equal to 1 for crisis period 2008-2010 and 0 otherwise.        is a vector of control variables. In 
Panel A, we exclude high- and upper-middle income countries while in Panel B we exclude bank-based countries. Different 
income groups are classified according to the World Bank classification. All models include industry (  ) and country (  ) 
fixed effects (not reported) and standard errors clustered at the industry-level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1 %, respectively. The robust t-values are presented in double parentheses based on the White heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors. Growth observations are winsorized at +100% and –100%. For detailed definitions of variables see 
Appendix. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all industries, 
countries or for the full sample period. 
Excluding
Panel A: high and upper-middle income countries
Fixed capital formation Output Value added
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.030***
[3.89] [3.87] [8.27] [8.05] [9.11] [8.69]
Crisis  -0.144 -0.103 -0.118* -0.117* -0.101 -0.110
[-1.43] [-1.58] [-1.72] [-1.83] [-1.60] [-1.55]
Real interest rate -0.003 -0.006*** -0.004***
[-1.47] [-10.56] [-5.95]
Financial development 0.004 0.003*** 0.003**
[1.12] [2.93] [2.10]
Constant -0.062 0.081 0.060*** 0.239*** 0.011 0.174***
[-1.56] [1.34] [4.64] [12.60] [0.71] [7.35]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
Observations 2618 2179 5425 4826 5055 4475
R-square 0.102 0.105 0.119 0.115 0.116 0.108
Panel B: bank-based countries
Fixed capital formation Output Value added
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.027***
[4.95] [3.99] [10.01] [8.99] [9.95] [9.19]
Crisis  -0.185*** -0.154*** -0.190*** -0.158*** -0.174*** -0.155***
[-5.50] [-3.73] [-15.73] [-11.79] [-12.14] [-9.58]
Real interest rate -0.003 -0.005*** -0.002**
[-1.38] [-7.78] [-2.40]
Financial development -0.001 0.002* 0.002*
[-0.36] [1.82] [1.78]
Constant -0.026 -0.004 0.040*** 0.195*** 0.002 0.120***
[-0.95] [-0.48] [3.56] [7.31] [0.14] [3.66]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33
Observations 3990 3381 6227 5409 6038 5217
R-square 0.229 0.244 0.260 0.287 0.216 0.233
Panel C: Crisis coefficient reproduced from Table 1 (baseline model)
Fixed capital formation Output Value added
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis -0.215*** -0.185*** -0.201*** -0.170*** -0.200*** -0.181***





Table 5: Financial development and industry growth during pre-crisis (2000-2007) and crisis (2008-2010) periods 
Regression (cross-section) results of model                                                    . Dependent variable is the growth in sectoral value added in each country 
over pre-crisis (2000-2007) or crisis (2008-2010) period.       is the fraction of value added of each sector in each country in year 2000.          is the credit to private sector (% of GDP). 
        is the external financial dependence of each sector taken from Klapper et al. (2006). In Panel B, we use Trade Credit instead of Ext. Fin., which is industry’s dependence on trade credit 
measured by accounts payable over total assets, taken from Fisman and Love (2003).  All models include industry (  ) and country (  ) fixed effects (not reported) and standard errors clustered 
at the industry-level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. The robust t-values are presented in double parentheses based on the White heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors. Growth observations are winsorized at +100% and –100%. For detailed definitions of variables see Appendix. Sample size varies across regression specifications 
because not all variables are available for all industries, countries or for the full sample period. 
Industry growth over 2001-2010
Fixed capita l  formation Output Value added
Pre-cris is Cris is Pre-cris is Cris is Pre-cris is Cris is
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: External Finance
Share -0.465*** -0.097 -0.149* -0.110 -0.162* -0.094*
[-3.41] [-1.10] [-1.89] [-1.50] [-1.82] [-1.88]
Financia l  development × 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001
Ext. Fin. [2.61] [1.54] [3.03] [1.38] [3.31] [1.16]
Constant 0.001 -0.088*** 0.112*** 0.017* 0.096*** 0.025**
[0.14] [-3.82] [18.80] [1.66] [11.77] [2.16]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 61 52 77 76 77 74
Observations 1247 967 1576 1449 1573 1415
R-square 0.337 0.237 0.407 0.258 0.282 0.233
Panel B: Trade Credit
Share -0.509*** -0.072 -0.162** -0.084 -0.169*** -0.082
[-3.70] [-0.33] [-2.08] [-0.89] [-2.88] [-0.72]
Financia l  development × -0.001 -0.001 -0.009*** 0.011* -0.005** 0.003*
Trad.Cred. [-1.53] [-0.29] [-2.69] [1.74] [-2.03] [1.81]
Constant -0.062 -0.018 0.110*** -0.015 0.148*** 0.023
[-1.06] [-0.16] [4.56] [-0.35] [4.47] [0.50]
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of countries 61 52 77 76 77 74
Observations 1247 967 1576 1449 1573 1415




Fig. 1. Corporate and commercial, and total loans as a fraction of banking sector’s total assets in 79 emerging and advanced 
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Fig. 2. Growth for 23 industries in 82 countries over the period 2000-2010. 
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